MDR ISSUE #001
Copy. Paste. Pivot.
A new ClickFix variant on a luxury real estate developer’s network swapped the usual PowerShell for rundll32. One detail did not fit the pattern, and our MDR analyst followed it to a contained incident before any credentials left the endpoint.
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The smoking gun
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Reconstruction
From first signal to full handover
Five stages of the analyst’s work, reconstructed from EDR telemetry
and Active Response Shell session logs.
A cluster of detections in a quiet tenant
EDR fires multiple correlated alerts on a single endpoint. The environment’s baseline is low-noise, so the cluster stands out as soon as it lands in the analyst queue.
Command line points to Windows Run, but the binary is wrong
The captured command executed through the Windows Run dialog, suggested ClickFix. The analyst expects PowerShell, CMD, or mshta. Instead, the command invokes rundll32. The hypothesis: a new variant designed to dodge the usual signatures.
Run MRU registry confirms a human pasted the command
Using the Active Response Shell, the analyst identifies the active user, resolves the account to the correct profile via ProfileList, and enumerates Run MRU entries. The exact command line from the alert appears at the top of the user’s command history.
Processes killed, endpoint isolated, infrastructure blocked
Within minutes of the initial alert, the analyst terminates the malicious processes, isolates the endpoint from the network, blocks the attacker’s domain in web protection, and flags the command pattern in the anti-exploit engine.
Full report delivered to the customer in Nebula
A complete reconstruction lands in the customer’s portal; how the attack unfolded, the actions taken, and a clear remediation list. Reimage the endpoint, rotate credentials, revoke active sessions, enforce MFA.